تأثیر انواع نظام‌های پرداخت بر مسئولیت‌پذیری شغلی

نوع مقاله: مقاله پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 کارشناس ارشد مدیریت دولتی، دانشگاه علامه طباطبایی

2 دانشیار گروه مدیریت دولتی دانشگاه علامه طباطبایی

چکیده

پژوهش حاضر با هدف بررسی انواع نظام‌های پرداخت و تأثیر آن بر مسئولیت‌پذیری و پاسخگویی کارکنان انجام شده است. پس از انجام مطالعات نظری و معرفی انواع نظام‌های پرداخت، مدل مفهومی نهایی طراحی شد که در آن، سه نوع نظام پرداخت (شامل: پرداخت ساعتی، پرداخت بر اساس «ارزیابی عملکرد ذهنی» و پرداخت رقابتی) به عنوان متغیرهای پیش‌بین و ساعات کاری و پایداری منابع انسانی به عنوان متغیرهای واسطه (میانجی) و مسئولیت‌پذیری شغلی به عنوان متغیر ملاک در نظر گرفته شد. برای سنجش متغیرها، از پرسشنامۀ استاندارد با طیف پنج‌گزینه‌ای لیکرت که در مجموع شامل 36 پرسش بود، استفاده شد. جامعۀ آماری شامل 360 نفر از کارکنان بانک ملت منطقۀ شمال‌غرب تهران می‌باشد. داده‌های جمع‌آوری‌شده با استفاده از نرم‌افزارهای SPSS نسخه 20 و SmartPLS نسخه 2 تحلیل شد. نتایج پژوهش، تأثیر منفی انواع نظام‌های پرداخت بر مسئولیت‌پذیری شغلی را نشان داد. همچنین، از میان نظام‌های پرداخت ارائه‌شده، پرداخت رقابتی به خاطر داشنن رابطه مثبت با ساعات کاری و پایداری، مناسب تشخیص داده شد که می‌تواند به‌طور مؤثر توسط سازمان‌ها و شرکت‌های دولتی و خصوصی مورد استفاده قرار گیرد.

کلیدواژه‌ها


عنوان مقاله [English]

The Effects of Various Payment Systems on Job Accountability

نویسندگان [English]

  • elnaz nejati 1
  • mirali sayyednaghavi 2
چکیده [English]

This research is aimed at assessment of the effects of various payment systems on accountability and responsiveness of the employees. Having studied the theoretical literature and having introduced the various payment systems, the researchers proposed the final conceptual model. This model included three payment systems: hourly payment, payment on the basis of evaluating mental performance, and competitive payment. These systems were employed as predictive variables, while office hours and human resource constancy were proposed as intermittent variables, and job accountability was regarded as standard variable. A questionnaire based on Likert table, composed of 36 questions, was employed to assess the variables. The research population included 360 employees at Mellat Bank in the north west of Tehran. The data was analyzed by SPSS20 and SmartPLS2. The results indicated that payment systems negatively affected job accountability. Competitive payment system came out to be appropriate due to its positive relation with office hours and constancy. It can be employed effectively by public organizations and companies.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Payment Structure
  • Constancy
  • Job Accountability
  • Payment Systems

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